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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper revisits the debate about communal management of natural resources 
and brings together various issues confronting it. Much of the criticism against common 
property regimes stems from an incorrect modeling of a common property situation, and 
misunderstandings about the terms and their wrong usage. Models of collective action 
(Hardin’s tragedy of the Commons, Olson’s Logic of Collective Action, and the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma) that are used as critique against common property regimes are not 
based on an accurate depiction of reality, and many of their assumptions are untrue. The 
purpose is to drive home the point that common property regimes are not inherently 
inferior types of regimes, and causes of success, and of failures, of these regimes lie 
elsewhere. Secondly, both public [and also private] management of natural resources has 
not had universal success. It is time to think out of the usual ‘either public or private’ 
dichotomy. Combining elements of both public and communal management in a 
pragmatic way is necessary. It is time to give co-management a serious thought!  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years communal management of natural resources has resurfaced as an 
issue in natural resource and environmental economics. For decades, this form of 
management had been relegated to a secondary position on account of being inferior to 
public or private management, owing to “Tragedy of the Commons”. However, 
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disillusionment with the latter types, especially public regimes, had sparked a revival of 
interest in common property regimes (CPRs), and study of CPRs has become an 
established field in natural resource economics.  
This research endeavor has been multifaceted. On one hand, it has focused on 
practical issues of compiling empirical evidence in favor of common property regimes 
and identifying conditions for their success, as well as challenges faced by them 
[Bromley (1992), Berkes (ed.) (1989), McCay and Acheson (1987)]. On the other, it 
seeks to tackle conceptual issues haunting this debate, which in its own sense is 
important because much of the criticism against common property regimes stems from 
(1) an incorrect modeling of a common property situation, and (2) misunderstandings 
about the terms and their wrong usage [Knudsen (1995), Ostrom (1999), (1990), Wade 
(1987)]. In terms of policy making, much ground has been covered for the ‘inclusive’ 
concept of development, where state and citizens work in unison. For the sake of 
common property regimes, it meant they could now be co-opted in the ‘co-management’ 
in solving particular resource management problems where state management had not 
proved to be effective. Yet, it seems governments in developing countries have not 
embraced the idea whole heartedly and the concept of including ‘people’ in resource 
management has remained elusive, marked more by rarity than by its preeminence. 
Phrases like ‘anti-tree’ attitudes, and antipathy [rather animosity]1 of people toward 
natural resources still dot the policy documents, and in many cases only lip service is 
paid to ‘co-management’, which is seen more as donor-driven policy agenda2.  
This paper revisits the debate about communal management of natural resources 
and brings together various issues confronting it. It begins by contextualizing the current 
debate on common property regimes, followed by a discussion, and clarification of many 
misconceptions and misunderstanding that render this debate a bit vague. The next 
section critically evaluates the models of collective action- namely Hardin’s tragedy of 
the Commons, Olson’s Logic of Collective Action, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma- used in 
arguments against CPR. Section five is devoted to policy implications i.e. the public-
private dichotomy, and its fallouts. By this time we hope to have made a sufficient 
ground for common property regimes. The sixth section serves that purpose. And finally 
                                                 
1 For example, reflecting on the relationship between the Forest Department and forest communities 
in the case of Pakistan, Dove (1994) notes that “the Forest Department has an attitude of mistrust towards 
local population and attributes overexploitation of tree products and deforestation of forested area to the 
‘anti-tree’ attitudes of the rural people. 
2 Even a casual screening of the Government of Pakistan’s Forestry Sector Master Plan (1992) 
reveals that government considers local people as the primary cause behind high deforestation rates in 
Pakistan and recommends strengthening government’s control over forests. [Hasan (2001)].  
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we have the concluding comment. The purpose is to drive home the point that common 
property regimes are not as irrational as hypothesized, and not necessarily bound to fail, 
as claimed. Secondly, public [and also private] management of natural resources has not 
had universal success. It is time to think out of the usual ‘either public or private’ 
dichotomy.  Combining elements of both public and communal management in a 
pragmatic way is necessary. It is time to give co-management a serious thought!  
 
 
II. PROPERTY REGIMES AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMNT 
 
What is common to the greatest number 
gets the least amount of care 
Aristotle 
 
All human life involves the use of material resources3 and the question of control 
and allocation of these resources arise in every society. A primal concern of societies is 
to decide upon the basic principles of this allocation. The problem arises because 
resources are scarce, compared to demands made on them. “Each society faces the 
problem of determining which, among the many competing claims on the resources 
available for use in the society are to be satisfied, when, by whom, and under what 
conditions” [Waldron (1988): 39).4 Property system, which is a system of rules governing 
access to and control over resources, solves this problem of allocation [ibid]. Typically, 
Property rights are relations among individuals that arise from the existence of scarce 
goods and pertain to their use. They specify the behaviourial norms with respect to 
objects that all people must observe in their interaction with other people or bear the 
penalty cost of non-observance [Pejovich (1990)]. 
The debate about property has generally revolved around the meaning, the sequence 
of development but also about the ‘superior’ form of property [Ostrom (1999)].5 Property 
institutions and their role in shaping resource use patterns have also been studied 
                                                 
3Resources are material things that can satisfy some human wants. 
4 The concept of scarcity is worth emphasizing. If resources were abundant we need not have to 
worry about their allocation and use. Their “scarcity is the presupposition of all sensible talk about 
property” [Waldron (1988: 31)]. 
5 Despite the fact that property systems encompass a continuum of possibilities from pure private to 
pure public regimes, the contemporary focus, especially during the cold war era, had narrowed down the 
choice between either the system of private property (the capitalist model) or that of public property (the 
socialist model); and relative superiority of either type and related economic system [Reeve (1986), 
Waldron (1988), Pejovich (1990). See also Williamson (1985)].  
 4
extensively. The manner in which people use environmental resources depends on the 
property rights governing those resources [Tietenberg (1994)]. It is argued that since human 
beings interact with their environment through institutions of property, and since much of the 
environmental deterioration is attributed to human activities, roots of environmental 
problems are to be traced to inadequate and ill-defined property institutions [Hanna and 
Munasinghe (1995)].6  
These property institutions are a part of over all institutions of a society [North 
(1990)]. Institutions are a set of rules that govern and constrain human interaction.7 The 
role of institutions in determining economic performance has been widely studied.8 Since 
institutions define the framework within which human interactions take place, and hence 
structure human behaviour, our environment, and more specifically, the resource use 
pattern is influenced by it.  
Though, property regimes vary in nature across a continuum from pure public to 
pure private, three types of regimes are typically focused: public property, private 
property and common property9.  They all differ in their ability to exclude non-right 
holders. Public Property Regimes are those where ownership (and control) over the 
resource belongs to the state. Although rights of use may be available for the public, the 
title does not rest with them. In a public property system the problem of allocation is 
solved by a social rule. The rule takes the collective interest of the society as the focal 
point, and use of resources is determined with respect to this interest [Waldron (1988)]. 
Private Property Regime is organized around the idea that each object belongs to 
some individual. Here individuals (and private entities) maintain ownership and control 
over the resources. A rule is laid down that in the case of each object the owner of that 
object is to determine how the object shall be used. His decision is to be upheld by the 
society as final (ibid). Private property gives its owner a legal right to exclude others.  
Common Property Regime implies a group property where a well-defined set of 
user has access and control rights over the resource. In a system of common property, 
rules governing access to and control of resources are organized on the basis that each 
                                                 
6Hanna and Munasinghe write that most of the environmental problems can be seen as problems of 
“incomplete, inconsistent, or unenforced property rights regimes” [Hanna and Munasinghe (1995), p. 15]. 
7This definition of institutions is adopted from North (1990).  
8This concept is explored by the NIE School of Thought. According to this school of thought 
institutions are important in determining the economic outcomes because they, together with other 
economic constraints, define the opportunity (or choice) set of individuals. [See Harris et al. (1995); North 
(1990, 1991); Ostrom (1990); Eggertsson (1990)]. 
9 Literature on CPRs also makes reference to the fourth regime called “non- Property Regimes (open 
access). We will discuss this type below. 
 5
resource is in principle available for the use of every member alike (Waldron 1988, p. 
41). A common property regime shares some of its features with that of public property 
in that no individual stands in a specially privileged situation with regard to any 
resource10, and some with private property regime in the sense that the resource is held 
like a private property by the group to the exclusion of non-owners. 
Much of the interest in property institutions and natural resource management is 
invoked by the Property Rights School11. They stress that property rights, which 
determine conditions of access to and control over scarce resources, have impact on the 
outcome of the natural resource sector.12 A well-defined structure of property rights 
induces efficiency in the use of resources.13  
Posner (1973) argues that the function of property rights is to create a structure of 
incentives to use resources efficiently.14  A “well-defined” structure of property rights 
would have four important features, i.e., rights are universal, exclusive, transferable and 
enforceable.15 Exclusivity implies exclusive ownership and a right to exclude non-
owners. It creates a link between one’s right to choose how to use the asset and bearing 
the consequences of that choice. Since the owner of the asset is the only person who will 
receive benefits from that decision, he will have an incentive to put his asset to the 
highest value use. Transferability provides incentive to move resources from less 
productive to more productive opportunities [Pejovich (1990:29)]. Enforceability means 
security from involuntary seizure or encroachment by others, what Honore calls a right to 
security against the expropriation of the asset.16  
Together these four conditions determine an efficient structure of property rights.  
In case of an inefficient structure of property rights, i.e. when rights are either not well 
defined and or not enforced, the private rate of return from an economic activity will 
differ from the social rate of return. This discrepancy implies that a third party will 
receive some of the benefits or will incur some of the costs. If this difference is large 
enough, such that the private costs exceed the private benefits, individuals will not be 
                                                 
10 But it is different in the sense that the interest of the collective has no special status. 
11 See Dragun (1987), Quiggin (1988), and Nabli and Nugent (1989) for a review. 
12 Though this school of thought implies that property rights have impact on the overall economic 
performance, but for the sake of this article their arguments are limited to natural resource sector.  
13Demsetz (1967) is one of the pioneering works on this field. Other prominent supporters of this 
view include Pejovich (1990), Tietenberg (1994, 1992), Tisdell (1993). Posner argues that the function of 
property rights is to create a structure of incentives to use resource efficiently [c.f. Reeve (1986): 23]. 
14Cited from Reeve (1986), p.  23. 
15The first three features are identified by Posner (1973) (cited from Reeve 1986) and the last feature 
is highlighted by Tietenberg (1992). 
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willing to under take socially profitable activities. Economic activities will shrink as a 
result. “The transfer of property rights amongst individual owners through contracting in 
the market place requires that the right be exclusive. Not only must the rights be 
measurable; they must also be enforceable” [North (1981: 36)]. 
 
 
III. MISPERCEPTIONS, CONFUSIONS AND THE COMMONS - COMMON 
PROPERTY REGIMES IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 
 
Men pay most attention to what is their own: they 
care less for what is common...men are more prone 
to neglect their duty when they think another is 
attending to it.17 
 
 
The Property Rights School asserts that a well-defined structure of property rights 
induces efficiency in the use of resources. According to the critics of CPRs, these 
regimes fail the efficiency criteria on many accounts.  Firstly, since resources managed 
under CPRs are group property and nobody is in any privileged position to claim 
exclusive ownership, a resource unit has to be physically captured to lay claim on it. This 
leads to ‘rent dissipation’. Secondly, since devising and enforcing rules requires 
collective action and group consensus, transaction costs18 associated with CPRs are 
high19. Thirdly, since, in a group property there is a loose connection between personal 
effort and returns, the resource is bound to suffer from low yield [Ostrom (1999)]. 
Another point of criticism against CPRs is the ‘economic rationality’ argument. 
Accordingly, even if a stint rule in the use of a resource is agreed upon by the user group, 
collective action required for observing that rule is bound to fail since a rational individual 
will find it to his own benefit to ignore the rule and over-exploit the resource, with the 
perception that if he does not capture the benefits others will do so. We will take up this 
argument in the next section.  
                                                                                                                                                 
16Reeve (1986) discusses that interest in a resource is conceptually linked to the means available to 
protect it. A claim to a resource is taken to be good against and legally guaranteed against any rival claims. 
17Aristotle in Politics, 1262. c.f. Waldron 1988, p. 6, emphasis added . 
18 Transaction costs include measurement costs and enforcement costs [North (1990)]. 
19 See also Demsetz (1967) for this point. 
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One other source of concern in the debate about common property management is 
the problem of misperceptions. Discussions about common property resource 
management are often afflicted with problems of misunderstanding and confusion among 
different terms, e.g. between a resource and regime, between common property and open 
access regimes.  
We first deal with the problem associated with confusing a common pool resource 
with a common property regime. The discussion usually puts the entire burden of 
mismanagement of common pool resources on CPRs. It ignores the fact that common 
pool resources have certain characteristics (difficulty of exclusion, susbtractibility) that 
make them difficult to manage under any kind of regime. This point will be elaborated 
below, but first some definitions are in order here. 
Resources are defined as something that offers benefits to human beings. An entity 
becomes a resource when people develop ability to command that benefit stream [Dani, 
Gibbs and Bromley (1987)]. Reeve (1986) describes resources as objects of want: 
something people wish for because it provides satisfaction, either direct or indirect, to 
them. Common pool resources as “natural or man made resources where exclusion is 
difficult and yield is subtractable. As such they share their first attribute with pure public 
goods and the second attribute with pure private good. The first attribute, difficulty of 
exclusion, results from factors such as cost of parcelling or fencing the resource and the cost 
of designing and enforcing property rights to exclude access to the resource. It is this 
attribute of common pool resource that makes them prone to free riding by others. The 
second attribute of subtractability means that resource unit that one person appropriates from 
the common-pool resource is not available to others” [Ostrom and Gardner (1993: 93)].  
These two attributes collectively make common pool resources vulnerable to extinction.20 
This vulnerability of common pool resources warrants the need to regulate the 
behaviour of its users. Rules have to be set for a sustainable level of exploitation of the 
resource; some kind of enforcement mechanism is needed as well. This function is provided 
by the resource regime. Typically, a resource regime refers to a structure of rights and 
duties characterising the relationship of individuals to one another with respect to that 
particular resource [Bromley and Cernea (1989:5)]. We have discussed the property 
regimes at some length above. 
While common pool resources have certain characteristics peculiar to them 
(subtractability, difficulty of exclusion), they can be managed under various kinds of 
                                                 
20The notion of resource management stems from their scarcity, if they were in unlimited supply the need 
may not have arisen. This applies to all resources and not just common property resource. 
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regimes. That is, they can be managed under public, private or common property regimes (or 
any mix of these regimes). For example, forestlands are managed by state institutions in 
Pakistan (and also elsewhere) [see Hasan (2001)]. Village commons have been privatized in 
India [Jodha (1994)]. Experience has shown that neither state nor private management of 
these resources has had universal success [see the two studies cited above]. In their haste, 
critics of CPRs wrongly associate problems related with the management of common pool 
resource to the common property regime.  
Second misconception relates to confusing common property regimes with open 
access regimes. While CPR has well-defined user group and use rights, open access 
regimes confer no such property rights. A resource under this regime belongs to the party 
that captures it first21. If property management arrangements are not determined then it 
can be predicted that the resource will eventually face extinction [Bromley and Cernea 
(1989)]. Critics of CPRs wrongly characterize them with situations that are more aptly 
defined as one with open access (no property rights). The problem of open access regime 
can arise when a resource, which is nominally under a particular (public, private or 
common) regime, is left unmanaged, and is not peculiar to CPRs only.  
 
 
IV. MODELS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COMMON PROPERTY REGIMES 
 
Common Property Regime consists of a well-defined and recognized group of 
users, a well-defined resource that the group manages and uses, and a set of institutional 
arrangements regulating its use. The resources held under such an arrangement are used by 
individuals but are not individually owned. They are a group property. This means that rules, 
which are developed for the use of a particular resource, must have the consensus of the 
group and each individual must abide by the rule. Thus, management of resources under 
common property system requires collective action in the formulation of rules of restrained 
use and in its observance22. 
A certain degree of pessimism prevails among analysts regarding the viability of 
common property regimes. Much of this stems from their lack of faith in the ability of 
resource users to act collectively in the sense described above. Their scepticism is based on 
                                                 
21 Bromley and Cernea (1989) define open access regime as one where “each potential user has 
complete autonomy to use the resource since on-one has the legal ability to keep any potential user out. 
The natural resource is subject to the rule of capture and belongs to no-one until it is in someone’s physical 
possession” [Bromley and Cernea (1989): 21]. 
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several theories of collective action. These are (1) the Prisoner’s Dilemma, (2) the Hardin’s 
Tragedy of the Commons, and (3) the Theory of Collective Action. Before dealing with them 
separately it will be benefiting to say what these theories imply. In essence, they all point to 
the problems associated with collective action and conclude that this may be an 
impossibility. If a group of user is required to act collectively, i.e., adopt a stint rule in the 
use of a resource, and this action is mutually beneficial to all of them, they will not do so 
unless an external agency imposes this rule on them. These theories contend that a 
“rational”23individual will find it to his own benefit to ignore the rule and over exploit the 
resource (free riding), fearing that if he does not do so others will capture the benefits. We 
now discuss the models separately, the objective will be to show that what these theories 
infer as compulsory outcome need not be the case for every situation requiring collective 
action- free riding remains a possibility but not an imperative.24  
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is visualized as a non-cooperative game in which 
communication among players is forbidden. Each player has complete information about the 
full structure of the game tree and the payoffs attached to outcomes. Each player has a 
dominant strategy, meaning that the player is always better off choosing that strategy.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
22Collective action is action by more than one person to achieve some common goal, or to satisfy some 
common interest; a goal or an interest that can not be achieved by a person acting alone (Wade 1987, p 97). 
23Mumtaz et al (1992) questions the concept of rationality used in these discussion and contends that 
economic rationality is only an aspect of a larger rationality, which is fundamental to the functioning of 
these societies. 
24See Wade (1987) and Ostrom (1990), Van de Laar (1990) for a description of these models. 
Box 1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
The game involves two persons [A and B], who are being question in isolation about a crime they 
had committed together. There is no communication between them and each person chooses only once, 
i.e. they cannot change the outcome afterwards. Each person faces the following scenario. If both 
persons cooperate, i.e. they remain silent, they will be set free. If person A cooperates and B defects then 
A will face long prison and B will go free. If both confess [i.e. defect], each one will get medium prison. 
The most desirable outcome is that both remain silent (i.e. cooperate) and that is a superior outcome. The 
dilemma that each faces is that in case he cooperates and the other one defects, he will be suckered. For 
each one of them, staying silent while the other defects, gives the worst outcome (long prison). 
Confessing the crime ensures that this worst outcome will be averted. So the rational strategy for both of 
them is to confess, and this is their dominant strategy. 
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If we apply the logic of the game [Box 1] to the use of common property resource, and 
consider the choice facing the two users as being either to cooperate (i.e., follow the rule) or 
not to cooperate (over-exploit), then the rational strategy of the individual will be not to 
cooperate. Preference for each individual will have the following order: (1) everyone follows 
the rule while he shirks (enjoys unrestrained access); (2) everyone, including himself, abides 
by the rule; (3) no one abides by the rule; (4) he abides by the rule while everyone else 
shirks. 
For the group, most desirable outcome will be the second one - each person 
observes the rule, but for the individual the most desirable outcome is the first one, i.e. he 
cheats while everyone else abides by the rule. This will then be the dominant strategy for 
him (non-cooperation- free riding). By doing so (i.e. cheating) he at least avoids the 
worst possible outcome for himself - he follows the rule when others enjoy unrestrained 
access, which results in a Pareto inferior outcome25. 
 . The paradox that individual rational strategies can lead to collectively irrational 
outcomes challenges the fundamental faith that rational individuals can achieve rational 
results. According to Campbell the dilemma suggests that It is impossible for rational 
individuals to cooperate26. 
Second model of collective action used for critique of CPRs is based on Hardin’s 
Tragedy of the Commons. Hardin’s seminal work “The Tragedy of the Commons” has 
been a cornerstone of debates about common property regimes. Though he presented his 
case on population problem as one involving no technical solution, his arguments have been 
widely used by others to condemn communal management of resources. 
Hardin envisions a grazing ground which is “open to all”. He then examines the 
situation from the point of view a “rational” herdsman. Each herdsman has a utility function, 
where he derives positive utility from selling his animal and negative utility from 
overgrazing of the pasture. His objective is to maximize his own utility. In this scenario, each 
herdsman is motivated to add more and more to his herd because he reaps the full, and direct, 
benefit from his animals but bears only a part of the cost resulting from overgrazing. He then 
concludes and I quote “each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his 
herd without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination towards which all men 
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the 
                                                 
25 A Pareto optimal outcome occurs when there is no other outcome strictly preferred by at least one 
player that is at least as good for the other. In this case both prefer cooperate-cooperate outcome so this 
outcome (confessing) is Pareto inferior. 
26Cited in Ostrom (1990). 
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commons” [Hardin (1968): 1244, emphasis added]. He believes that the only solution to this 
problem is coercion by an external authority. 
Olson’s Logic of Collective Action is yet another attempt to theorize the 
impossibility of rational individuals to pursue collective welfare. Olson questioned the 
accepted view that individuals with common interest will act together to further those 
interests, and that possibility of a collective benefit to a group is sufficient to generate 
collective action. Rather, he suggests and I quote what has come to be the most quoted 
phrase from his work that “unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there 
is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, 
rational, self interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group 
interests” [Olson (1965): 2]. The argument is that a person who cannot be excluded from 
the benefits of a collective good once the good is provided will have little incentive to 
contribute in the provision of that good, unless some kind of coercion is exercised. 
Summing up, the common theme running among all three of these models is the free 
rider problem. The free rider problem results when an individual shirks responsibility to the 
group. When a person cannot be excluded from the benefits of a joint action he will have a 
motivation not to contribute in the efforts. If each individual decides to free ride then the 
action will not take place at all. It points to the impossibility of having a collective action. 
This has implication for the management of resources. This school of thought believes 
that common property management is bound to fail. They base their judgement on the 
following arguments. (1) each rational individual has a motive to shirk its duty to the group 
i.e. not contribute in the effort of managing the resource and thereby over exploit it, (2) it is a 
dominant strategy in the sense that he is always better off choosing this strategy, (3) even if 
an agreement is struck that requires that each individual will stint on the use of the resource, 
the strict dominance of the individual strategy makes such co-operation unstable because 
each individual prefers that the other stints while he overexploits  (Runge 1992, p 26). 
Under this approach, even if individuals develop a rule to enforce stinting, the problem 
will not be resolved because no one has an incentive to abide by the rule. Therefore, the 
enforcement of the rule must come from outside, hence the appropriate property systems are 
exogenous.  
 
V. EITHER STATE OR MARKET – THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY 
 
“The alternative of the commons is too horrifying to 
contemplate. Injustice is preferable to total ruin.” 
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(Hardin 1968, p. 1247). 
The models discussed above provide a rational for an external agency to take control, 
some recommend a state control while others opt for a private control. We discuss them one 
by one. 
 
State Control 
 
“If ruin is to be avoided people must be responsive to a coercive force outside their 
individual psyches, a ‘Leviathan’ to use Hobbes’s term”27. Ophuls argues that the tragedy of 
the commons provides a rationale for state control with major coercive power [cited from 
Ostrom (1990): 8]. “Common property [read pool] resources require public control if 
economic efficiency is to result from their development” [Carruthers and Stoner, quoted in 
Ostrom (1990): 9]. The state control is taken to mean the central government control. The 
central authority will decide who can use the resource, how and when can he use it. Needless 
to say that they are assumed to be able governments who possess complete and accurate 
information about the resource and its use, who are able to device appropriate policies and 
above that have the ability to implement them, that they have monitoring capabilities, 
sanctioning reliabilities and zero cost of administration [Ostrom (1990): 8-10]. Breakdown 
of any of these assumptions means a less than optimal utilization of the resource.  
Experience has shown that nationalization of resources has generally resulted in their 
degradation. Local level resources when appropriated by the central state and then left 
unmanaged and uncontrolled by the state have deteriorated over time [see Azhar (1993), 
Commander (1986), Messerschmidt (1986), Arnold and Campbell (1986)]. The de facto 
management regime is one of non-property, or open access (Bromley 1992, Ostrom 
1990).  Resource degradation “actually originates in the dissolution of local level 
institutional arrangement whose very purpose was to give rise to resource use patterns 
that were sustainable” [Bromley and Cernea (1989): 7].  
Further, those advocating a role of state in resource management assume a neutral 
state. According to the Public Interest theory the political decision makers and the 
bureaucrats are not neutral in their decisions and they seek to further their self-interests. 
They are seen as rational utility maximising individuals. So if this concept of economic 
rationality of an individual was used to advance the notion that communal management is 
bound to fail, and if it is equally applicable to the decision makers in the state, the 
                                                 
27Hardin (1978) quoted in Ostrom (1990, p. 9). 
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implications are very clear - the state management may also fail. The process of 
deforestation in the South-east Asia (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines in 
particular) and the role that large logging concessions have played in that is a case in 
point. 
Blaikie identified factors such as lack of political will, lack of interest on part of the 
bureaucrats, and incapable administrators, among others, as contributing towards failure of 
soil conservation programmes [Blaikie (1985): 83-88]. 
Dasgupta and Mäler (1994) suggest that public ownership need not be a good basis for 
resource allocation. Decision makers are usually far removed from the site, and have little 
knowledge of the local ecology, their time horizon are often short, and they are in many 
instances under the influence of interests groups far removed from the resource. There is 
little case for centralized control. 
  
Privatization 
 
Privatization of a resource is basically promoted from the point of view of efficiency. 
Private ownership internalizes costs and benefits associated with the resource; this creates 
incentive for the owner to utilize resources more efficiently [Demsetz (1967)]. Under 
communal ownership there is no incentive to conserve the resource; this is not the case when 
resources are private property [Tisdell (1993)]. Privatization increases individual 
responsibility for the environment and rational use of its resources.28Where it is difficult to 
create private property rights (in the case of mobile resources, e.g.), management must 
choose from various types of imperfect approximations of property rights [Townsend and 
Wilson 1987: 318]. 
Privatization of resources has not served as panacea for their conservation, in fact, in 
many cases it has contributed to a faster destruction of resources. In India, privatization of 
land not just had a negative repercussion on the rural poor by their disentitlement from the 
CPR, but also caused a faster destruction of native vegetation [Jodha 1992, 1994)]. In Brazil, 
the conversion of forestland to pastures for cattle ranching activities accounted for 
approximately seventy two percent of land use alterations captured by Landsat imagery up 
till the late 1980s. Almost 30% is accounted by a few hundred large-scale, heavily 
                                                 
28Furoboton and Pejovich (1972), quoted in McCay and Acheson (1987). 
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subsidized ranches, which was given a boost by the government fiscal incentives to the 
livestock sector [Browder (1988)]29. 
Moreover, it has to be judged if the process is cost effective or not. Privatization of a 
resource involves parcelling out resources and handing them over to individual owners. 
There are costs involved in such an action; cost of assigning, defining and enforcing these 
rights. The fair enforcement of formalized private rights and duties may be prohibitively 
costly compared with customary arrangements and too high for a village economy to bear 
[Runge 1992: 20]. Further, privatization has serious distributional implications. The 
question here is who decides about the assignment of ownership rights. Jodha’s research on 
India indicates that between 49-86 percent of the privatized land ended up under the control 
of the better segments of the society [Jodha 1986)]. The increased privatization of land 
marginalizes people and forces them to use the commons more intensively and hence 
contributes to the shrinking potential of the commons themselves [Blaikie 1985:  130]. 
 
 
VI. RATIONALISING COMMON PROPERTY REGIMES 
 
Evidence from around the world points out that neither state nor private regimes 
have been uniformly successful in an effective management of common pool resources. 
If it can be established that common property regime may be a workable alternative then 
we do not have to occupy ourselves with the dichotomy of either state or market. 
The models of collective action that were used as critique against CPRs have come 
under severe criticism. Taking the case of prisoner’s dilemma, outcomes under this game are 
based on two key assumptions. (1) players have no communication and they make their 
choice in ignorance of other’s choice, and (2) each player chooses only once and cannot 
revert his decision afterwards i.e. upon finding what other player has chosen [Wagner 
(1983)]. Together they imply that two players cannot negotiate among themselves to change 
the rules of the game and adjust their behaviour accordingly [Wade (1987)]. Any situation 
that is modelled as the prisoner’s dilemma must satisfy these two assumptions. These two 
assumptions will be used to explain why the common property situation need not be a 
prisoner’s dilemma situation. 
While these assumptions are suitable for the game under discussion in which suspects 
had no previous ties, no code of honour, and no expectation of future interaction, each 
                                                 
29 “SUDAM [Superintendencia do Desenvolvimento da Amazonia] funding of livestock projects has 
contributed more to deforestation in the Amazon than any other government subsidy program” [Browder 
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person knows that he will not have another opportunity to confess; they will be less suitable 
if the situation is an enduring and recurrent one. If the prisoners know that the game will be 
played repeatedly the chances that they will cooperate in the hope that others will then do so 
are much higher [Wade (1987)]. Reality is more complex than this simplified game; here 
considerations of morality, power and loyalty put checks on free riding. People choose not to 
free ride when others are cooperating because to do so would run against their moral 
standards [ibid]. Short-term benefits resulting from shirking may be more than offset by cost 
arising within the group from breaking the institutional rule. In cases where shirking is not a 
dominant strategy, cost of reputation loss is very high [Runge (1981)]. 
Furthering his point in a later publication, Runge (1992) argues that village level 
decision-making is more akin to the “assurance problem” - where there are no dominant 
strategies, and decisions are interdependent (expected decisions of others enter one’s 
decision function) - than to a prisoner’s dilemma game. In an assurance problem a variety of 
outcome is possible. What is needed in this situation is a cooperation of a critical mass, and 
not necessarily every individual, to convince a villager to cooperate and hence benefit from 
the stinting. It is precisely the role of village level conventions, including common property 
institutions, to reinforce expectations of collective behavior leading a critical mass of 
individuals to adopt such a solution [Runge (1992):  27-32]. 
Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ is also cast in terms of a prisoner’s dilemma 
game, although he himself did not use this parable, but his analysis is based on similar 
assumptions - no communication and no change in behaviour (Dawes, cited in Wade 1987). 
Focussing on Hardin’s no communication and no information assumption, it implies 
that each herdsman is not aware of the action of the others, of the overall condition of the 
common, and that it is heading toward total ‘ruin’. Each herdsman makes a rational decision 
of adding one more to his herd just before the time of resource breakdown, and hence 
hastens the destruction. This implication brings out the issue of information people have 
about the larger system and environment in which they operate [Kimber (1983) cited in 
Wade (1987)]. While Hardin’s parable may hold for very large resource systems (open sea 
fishing), it is less likely to be a situation of a common property held by a village where the 
level of interaction, and flow of information among the residents is high, making the 
monitoring of the condition of commons an easier task. Kimber further point out that Hardin 
does not distinguish between the situations where resource is vital for the survival of users 
and where it is not. In situations where it is vital, a rational user will stop at some point well 
before complete plunder of the resource. 
                                                                                                                                                 
(p, 265].  
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Criticism on Hardin’s allegory is replete with one more, and probably the most 
important, point- his failure to distinguish an open access regime from a common property 
regime. While his story could easily fit a situation of open access, it is less befitting for a 
common property regime where a group ownership exists and access is open only to the 
members of the group. Monitoring the activities of the group and ensuring compliance with 
the rule stands greater chance under these conditions [Wade (1987)]. When CPRs are 
wrongly identified as open access regimes, chances for human co-operation and collective 
action are dismissed [Bromley and Cernea (1989)]. 
In Olson’s logic of collective action, he is true in identifying the tendency of human 
being to free ride in the absence of coercion, but as discussed earlier that village life has an 
element of social coercion. Supporters of common property regime claim that this social 
coercion is very important in reducing possibility of free riding. 
As opposed to widely held conception, common property regimes are not free for 
all. They are structured ownership arrangements in which management rules are 
developed, group size is known and enforced, incentives exist for co-owners to the rules 
and sanctions are at work to ensure compliance [Bromley and Cernea (1989)]. 
Communities have relied on this particular form of property institution to manage 
resources with reasonable degree of success over long period of time30. It is true that 
success with this kind of property institution has not been an across the board 
phenomenon, but neither has it been the other way round. The causes of its success are 
many so are the reasons for its failure31. 
At times it surfaces as the only rational arrangement under certain circumstances. 
Runge (1992) discusses why common property regime may be the best possible choice 
for village conditions, on grounds of both efficiency and equity. He argues that the village 
life in the developing world has characteristics that make common resource management as 
the only viable strategy. One such characteristic is relative poverty. This makes the 
transaction cost of well-defined system of property rights much higher than that under 
traditional system and too great for them to bear. The more things for which rights are 
defined the greater the social investment in assignment, definition, and adjudication will be. 
Dependence on natural resources is another characteristic. Villagers rely on natural 
                                                 
30For successful cases of common property regime see Arnold and Campbell (1986), Bromley and 
Cernea (1989), Bromley (1992), Berkes (ed.) (1989), McCay and Acheson (1987), Mumtaz and Durr-e-
Nayab (1991), and Ostrom and Gardner (1993), Wade (1992).  
31See Ostrom (1990) for commonalities among successful common property regimes, especially pp. 
88-102. 
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resources for most part of their livelihood and given these resources vary considerably in 
terms of their productivity over time and space a joint ownership is preferred with a view to 
avoid unequal distribution of resources. A third characteristic is a high degree of 
uncertainty with respect to income. This element of uncertainty about future emphasizes 
inclusion of other as a guard against risks. The expectation is that when one is in need help 
will come from others. All this creates a structure of incentives that makes collective 
management a rational strategy. The incentives leading to a particular institutional choice 
must result from the physical and social environment in which this choice is made. 
 
VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
Some observations are made as concluding remarks. Resource management without 
proper institutions is doubtful. “Institutions provide a set of constraints which governs the 
behavioral relations among individuals or group” [Nabli and Nugent (1989): 1335]. Rawls 
define institutions as public system of rules that specify certain forms of action as 
permissible, others as forbidden, and provide for certain penalties and defences when 
violations occur. [C.f. Runge (1984): 807]. “Institution channel the behavior of people with 
respect to each other and their belongings, providing assurances by setting the ‘rules of the 
game’. They increase the value of a stream of benefits associated with economic activity by 
coordinating behavior and reducing uncertainty in the realm of human interaction” [ibid. p 
807]. 
Accordingly, property institutions are public system of rule specifying permissible and 
forbidden actions in relation to ownership use rights, responsibilities and obligations of 
individuals and groups (Bromley, cited in Runge 1984, p 807). The choice of institution 
should be based on the existing socio-economic and political set up. Institutions of public or 
private property, which have taken roots in the West, may not be replicable, or even 
applicable particularly for villages in developing countries. Both private regime and state 
regime are expensive to make effective. Already overstretched states in the developing 
countries may not be able to provide the necessary resources to make the work in the myriad 
of microenvironments. A malfunctioning approximation to a formalized system of state 
control or private system may prove to be inferior form of management when seen in 
contrast to a local management of resources [Wade (1987)]. 
Critics of common property regime question the rationality and viability of such a 
regime, contending that these institutional arrangements do not allow a sustainable 
management of resources. They then suggest replacing these with either state or market 
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solution. The problem with their analysis is that they tend to ignore institutional problems 
associated with either of the situations. They assume an institution free environment for their 
analysis, but “neither state nor market is unproblematic in composition, dynamics or effect” 
[Sinha and Herring (1993: 1431)]. Institutional rigidities are very important in explaining the 
failures of these management regimes. Bromley (1989) writes, “If the right conditions exist – 
divisibility, mobility, full ownership of all valuable resources, full information, and well-
functioning markets – then the allocation of all factors of production will be efficient. As a 
definition this is fine; as a policy prescription in a world where not all valuable resources are 
fully divisible and capable of individual ownership, where all resources are not fully mobile, 
where information is imperfect, where many markets are not present, where the future is 
unrepresented, then our standard advice [of privatization] is suspect” [Bromley (1989): 875]. 
Common property regime may be the only viable choice under certain (village life) 
conditions such as: relative poverty, resource dependence, uncertainty, high cost of 
transaction for alternative institutions. Free riding, which lies at the core of the attack against 
common property regime, need not be a universal phenomenon. In fact, in the villages of the 
developing countries social pressure is enough to keep people from free riding. Further, 
given a high level of interaction, monitoring is not an enormously difficult task in these 
villages32. 
All this is not meant to say that common property regime are the panacea for 
commons. Common property regime can and do break down under internal or external 
pressures. Population pressures, diversification of the village economy, breaking of 
cultural ties can put common property regime to a test situation, and it may not come out 
as triumphant. Similarly, the overall environment in which a common property regime 
has to survive is crucial in determining the chances of its success. The infusion of modern 
techniques, government policies, and its attitude in terms of giving priority to common 
property regime are vital. In most instances common property regimes are not looked at 
with same degree of importance as private regime and as such do not enjoy an equal level 
of government support. Privatization of commons, which is offered as a solution to the 
‘tragedy of commons’ cannot work unless enforced (and supported) by state 
institutions33. If CPRs are extended the same level of support from the government 
agencies, these regimes have a fair chance of success. Common Property Regimes are not 
inherently inferior types of regimes. In fact, these can be a superior form of regimes 
under conditions where both state and private property regimes are costly to establish. 
                                                 
32 See Wade (1987) for this point. 
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Further, since both public and private management of natural resources have not 
had universal success, it is time to think out of the usual ‘either public or private’ 
dichotomy.  Combining elements of both public and communal management – collective 
management - in a pragmatic way is necessary. Experience with forest management in 
Pakistan has shown that local people can complement government institutions 
remarkably well in halting forest degradation34.  
Collective management has been used to identify a great variety of institutional set 
up including different combinations on the scale from self-management to state 
management [Sagdahl (1992), c.f. Benjaminsen (1995); 11-12].35 However, it is usually 
taken to mean shared responsibility of management among different parties36. Ideally, the 
nature of the responsibility is decided according to the comparative advantage of the 
party. However, experience has shown that the sustainability of such a collective 
management system requires, as a prerequisite, the presence of local level institutions37. 
Finally, as Runge (1992) points out different institutions are responses to different 
local environments, they are likely to range along a continuum of property rights, from pure 
private rights to pure public rights, depending upon the resource management problem. 
Search for appropriate institutional arrangement must respect traditions and constraints of 
local needs. There are no universal recipes for efficient and equitable resource management. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 Bromley and Cernea (1989) write, “Private property would be nothing without the requisite 
authority system that makes certain the rights and duties are adhered to” [Bromley and Cernea (1989): 17]. 
34 One of the success stories relates to the case of Chaprote forest, which is situated in the Nagar 
Valley of the Gilgit district in the Northern Areas of Pakistan, where a village committee, in recognition of 
their traditional rights, was first merely involved in the management of forest and later on given complete 
charge of the forest. Mumtaz and Nayab (1992) report the committee was successful in putting a check on 
the deforestation process [Mumtaz and Nayab (1992)]. The second experience comes from the Kalam 
Integrated Development Project (KIDP). The KIDP improvised the concept of petty (local) contractors, as 
against big contractors who were notorious for their alleged collusion with the forest department and over-
cutting, and also supported involvement of the village community in the making of working plan [Khan 
and Zurflueh (1994)]. Also See Poffenberger (1995) for a successful experience with forest protection 
committees, formed of local tribal population, in the Jungle Mahals of West Bengal. He writes that the 
emergence of these committees is grounded in tribal resistance movements against state control.  
35 Other term used to denote this practice is co management. McCay and Acheson (1987) write that it 
signifies the political claim of local communities to the right to share management power and responsibility 
with the state. “It is an attempt to formalize a de facto situation to mutual dependence and interaction in 
resource management (McCay and Acheson 1987, pp. 31-32). 
36 Seabright (1993) writes that “all forms of collective management involve some asymmetry in the degree 
of involvement of different parties. At one end of the spectrum is the practice of delegating managerial 
responsibility to an agent charged with managing the asset on behalf of others; at the other, full 
participatory decision making” (Seabright 1993, p. 130).  
37 See Mumtaz and Nayab (1992), Khan and Zarflueh (1994) for case studies validating this point. 
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